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Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie
Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last?
Jeffrey A. Greenblattt
Suppose A is injured in an automobile accident, incurring
$5,000 of medical expenses. His automobile insurance carrier
reimburses him for these expenses under a personal injury
clause in his automobile insurance policy. The policy provides
that the insurer's interest takes priority in any recovery from a
tortfeasor. A then sues B, the tortfeasor, for these medical ex-
penses, as well as an additional $10,000 of pain and suffering.
When A recovers the full $15,000 from B, nearly all courts
agree that the doctrine of subrogation requires him to repay the
$5,000 of medical payments to his insurer.' But when A recovers
only $12,000 from B, the outcome becomes less certain. Should A
recover his $10,000 of pain and suffering first, leaving $2,000 for
his insurer to recover its medical payments, or should the insurer
receive its $5,000 first, leaving $7,000 for A?
The amount of money at stake boggles the mind-and rivals
the federal deficit. The issue of priority is not limited to automo-
bile coverage or to a specific kind of injury; it may involve any
first party insurance, including homeowner's, health, and dis-
ability.2 The tobacco litigation alone may well settle for $250-300
billion dollars,' and health care insurers will want their share.
One would think the matter settled by the contract between
the insurer and insured. A typical contract provides as follows:
Subrogation. This Company may require from the insured
an assignment of all right of recovery against any party for
loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by this
Company.4
t First Rabbinic Degree 1989, Telshe Rabbinical College; Second Rabbinic Degree
1993, Telshe Rabbinical College; J.D. 1997, The University of Chicago.
' Mark S. Rhodes, 16 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 61:29 at 109 (Law Co-op
rev ed 1983) ("Couch on Insurance").
2 Insurance purchased by an individual to compensate him in the event of loss is re-
ferred to as first party insurance.
' Alix M. Freeman and Suein L. Hwang, Peace Pipe: Philip Morris, RJR And Tobacco
Plaintiffs Discuss a Settlement, Wall St J Al (Apr 16, 1997).
' Garrity v Rural Mutual Insurance Co, 77 Wis 2d 537, 253 NW2d 512, 513 (1977).
See also Wimberly v American Casualty Co of Reading, Pa, 584 SW2d 200, 201 (Tenn
1979). Blue Cross and Blue Shield have a more explicit clause:
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The clause seems unambiguous on its face: when the insurer has
made a payment, it may require the insured to assign his rights
to recover that payment. Under the contract, the insurer recovers
first. Nevertheless, many courts require that the insured be fully
compensated before the insurer receives anything, ignoring the
terms of the contract.' They base their holdings on a variety of
rationales: ambiguous or unclear language in the contract provi-
sion; risk allocation; and a talismanic doctrine that the insured
must be "made whole," which some courts assert is an unalter-
able element of subrogation.
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine under which one who
has paid a debt for which he is secondarily responsible takes over
the creditor's rights and remedies against the party primarily re-
sponsible for that debt.' In the insurance context, subrogation is
the right of the insurer "to be put in the position of its insured
against third parties legally responsible to its insured for the loss
which the insurer has both insured and paid."7 Thus, the right of
subrogation technically gives the insurer only the right to recover
from the tortfeasor or other third parties, but not from its in-
sured.8 Nevertheless, it has come to include the right of an in-
surer to recover its outlays, either from a tortfeasor or from an
insured who has already collected from a tortfeasor.9
In the event any benefits or services of any kind are furnished to you or payment
made or credit extended to or on behalf of any covered person for a physical condi-
tion or injury caused by a third party or for which a third party may be liable, the
Plan shall be subrogated and shall succeed to such covered person's rights of recov-
ery against any such third party to the full extent of the value of any such benefits or
services furnished or payments made or credits extended.
Higginbotham v Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 312 Ark 199, 849 SW2d 464, 465
(1993).
Garrity, 253 NW2d at 516; Rimes v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co,
106 Wis 2d 263, 271-72, 316 NW2d 348, 353 (1982) (following Garrity).
6 Ronald H. Horn, Subrogation in Insurance Theory and Practice 13-14 (S.S. Huebner
Foundation 1964).
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co v Auto Spring Supply Co, 59 Cal App 3d 860, 864,
131 Cal Rptr 211 (1976), citing Sacramento-Yolo Port District v Cargill of California, Inc,
4 Cal App 3d 1004, 1010, 84 Cal Rptr 822 (1970).
Horn, Subrogation in Insurance at 13-14 (cited in note 6).
See, for example, Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co v Martin, 377 S2d 827, 828-29
(Fla Dist Ct App 1979).
For purposes of this Comment, it is irrelevant whether the insurer proceeds against
the tortfeasor or against an insured who has already collected payment from the tortfea-
sor. The substantive rights among the parties do not change. See Automobile Insurance
Co ofHartford v Conlon, 153 Conn 415, 216 A2d 828, 829 (1966) ("The proposition is well
established that an insurer's right to subrogation... includes a claim against any judg-
ment secured by the insured against any party at fault for the amount paid by the insurer
in satisfaction of the insured's damage claim under the policy.") (citations omitted).
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The question of priorities has generated considerable confu-
sion in the courts. Some courts require the insured to be fully
compensated before the insurer recovers its outlays; others re-
quire the insurer to be compensated before the insured is paid
(also called pro tanto); yet others require pro rata sharing. The
only unanimity in the courts is a categorical rejection of insurer-
first as a default rule. Arguments on all sides of the debate are
unpersuasive because they focus on whether subrogation as an
historical doctrine permits the insurer to recover first, rather
than focusing on the optimal contract term.
This Comment approaches the question from the standpoint
that, while the historical doctrine is a useful starting place, it
should neither be considered in a vacuum nor taken as a given.
Particularly when insurance contracts are involved, the analysis
should focus on the heart of insurance issues: risk allocation.
This Comment argues that optimal risk allocation dictates that
the insurer should recover first.
Section I introduces the law of subrogation-its history, cur-
rent incarnation, and the policies that drive it. The Section ends
with a description of the mechanics of subrogation as applied to
the insurance context. Section II sets out the various approaches
courts have taken when faced with questions of subrogation pri-
ority and the contractual terms affecting it. Section III contains
an analysis of the law of subrogation. It begins with a doctrinal
analysis, exploring how the law of suretyship would treat subro-
gation priority in the insurance context and explaining the dif-
ferences between suretyship and insurance. Section III concludes
with an economic analysis of insurance subrogation, including
risk allocation, definitional problems, and the potential for stra-
tegic behavior.
I. SUBROGATION: A PRIMER
Subrogation finds its roots in suretyship. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that suretyship derives from the Roman civil
law doctrine of Cessio Actionum. ° Under this doctrine, A could
10 Horn, Subrogation in Insurance at 15 (cited in note 6); M.L. Marasinghe, An His-
torical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Early History of the Doctrine, 10
Valp L Rev 45, 50 (1975). More likely, the origin is in Talmudic Law, where a surety who
discharges the debt of a debtor may proceed directly against the debtor; his right arises
by operation of law. Tractate Baba Basra 174(a), Babylonian Talmud (discussing a surety
repaying a debt incurred by minor orphans' father). Maimonidies (11th century) cites the
doctrine in his Code, adding that this rule only applies when the debtor asked the party
to become a surety; that is, when A has a legal obligation to pay the creditor. Mai-
monidies Code, Laws of Debtor-Creditor 26:6. When the party pays the creditor of his own
volition, he may not proceed against the debtor. Id.
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acquire B's rights against C. There are, however, striking differ-
ences between the Roman law doctrine and its present-day ana-
log. First, under Roman law, B had to expressly cede those rights
to A; they did not arise by operation of law. Second, since the dis-
charge of the debt terminated any claims B could make against
C, if A did not acquire B's rights before or at the time he paid C's
debt, he was forever barred from pursuing C.
Whatever its venerable origins, subrogation is now firmly
ensconced as a doctrine of equity. This equitable character has
led many courts to adopt the "made-whole" doctrine, which holds
that the insured must be fully compensated before the insurer
can recover any of its outlays.'
In the patois of subrogation, the party to whom the debt is
owed is the subrogor; the party who has paid him and succeeds to
his rights is the subrogee. The subrogee is said to be subrogated
to the rights of the subrogor. In the suretyship context, the credi-
tor is the subrogor and the surety (guarantor) is the subrogee. As
applied to insurance, the tortfeasor "owes a debt" to the insured
victim. The insured victim may be thought of as the creditor, and
his insurance company is thus secondarily liable to him for the
tortfeasor's debt: if the tortfeasor does not pay the insured, the
insurer must pay for the insured's injuries. Thus, the insured vic-
tim is the subrogor and the insurance company is the subrogee.
There are four essential elements of a subrogation claim: (1)
the party claiming the subrogation rights has paid the debt; (2) it
has paid the debt pursuant to a legal obligation, and not merely
voluntarily; (3) it is secondarily liable for the debt; and (4) al-
lowing the subrogation will not cause injustice to the subrogor 3
The doctrine of subrogation serves three functions. First, it
prevents the subrogor (here, the insured victim) from being un-
justly enriched by recovering once from his insurance company
See, for example, Powell v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 581 S2d 772,
774 (Ala 1990) ('The entire law of subrogation... is based upon equitable principles.");
Couch on Insurance § 61:20 at 96-97 (cited in note 1) ("The doctrine of subrogation in in-
surance... has its origin in general principles of equity .... [S]ubrogation... is purely
equitable in its nature, and will not be enforced when it would work injustice to the rights
of those having equal equities.") (citations omitted).
"See, for example, Rimes v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 106 Wis 2d
263, 316 NW2d 348, 353 (1982) ('The entire law of subrogation is based upon equitable
principles .... Thus, even though an insured has recovered from a tortfeasor a sum more
than sufficient to equal the subrogated amount claimed by the insurer, the insurer is not
entitled to subrogation unless thd insured has been made whole for his loss."); Powell, 581
S2d at 777 (describing full compensation as "a prerequisite to the right of subrogation"
that cannot be contracted away).
"John Alan Appleman, 11 Insurance Law and Practice § 6501 at 431 (West rev ed
1981).
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and once from the tortfeasor. Second, it reimburses the insurance
company for its payments. Third, it places the burden of compen-
sation on the tortfeasor and thus deters injurious behavior. 4
Subrogation arises in the insurance context when an insur-
ance company reimburses its insured for injuries he received at
the hands of a tortfeasor. Technically, subrogation only permits
the insurer to pursue the tortfeasor; an insurer has other rights
that enable it to recover from an already compensated insured. 5
Most courts, however, ignore this distinction. 6
Subrogation arises either by operation of law or by contract.
Subrogation by operation of law, called legal or equitable subro-
gation, arises when, pursuant to an obligation, one party pays a
debt owed to another by a third party. Subrogation by contract,
also called conventional subrogation, arises in the insurance con-
text when an insurance policy explicitly grants the insurer a
right of subrogation.1 Insurance policies usually include such a
provision.
II. SUBROGATION PRIORITY
Courts agree that under the common law an insurer's equi-
table subrogation interest does not arise until the insured has
been made whole.'" Courts part company, however, when a con-
tract gives the insurer's subrogation interest priority in any re-
covery from a tortfeasor. Courts differ on three points: first,
whether to permit the contract to alter equitable subrogation
rights at all; second, how to decide whether the insured has been
made whole; and third, if a contract can give priority to the in-
surer, how explicitly it must do so.
' Couch on Insurance § 61:18 at 9 (cited in note 1).
15 Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co v Auto Spring Supply Co, 59 Cal App 3d 860, 864,
131 Cal Rptr 211 (1976), citing Sacramento-Yolo Port District v Cargill of California, Inc,
4 Cal App 3d 1004, 1010, 84 Cal Rptr 822 (1970) (defining insurer's subrogation right as
one against "third parties" legally responsible for the insured's loss).
" See, for example, Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co v Martin, 377 S2d 827, 828-29
(Fla Dist Ct App 1979) (Insurer sought reimbursement under a subrogation claim from
funds recovered from the tortfeasor by the insured.). But see Maynard v State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co, 902 P2d 1328, 1333 (Alaska 1995) (distinguishing right of
reimbursement, in the form of a setoff in an insurance policy, from subrogation).
, Robert E. Keeton and Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.10 at 220 (West 1988).
See, for example, Higginbotham v Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 312 Ark
199, 849 SW2d 464,466 (1996).
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A. Contractual Alteration of Common Law Subrogation
1. Giving priority to the insured: the "made-whole" doctrine.
In Rimes v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 9
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, under both legal and
conventional subrogation, the insured must be made whole be-
fore the insurer can share in the recovery. The court gave two
reasons. First, the purpose of subrogation is to prevent double re-
covery by the insured, and such double recovery is impossible
unless the insured has recovered the full amount of his damages
from the tortfeasor. ° Second, the court reasoned that, "where ei-
ther the insurer or the insured must to some extent go unpaid,
the loss should be borne by the insurer for that is a risk the in-
sured has paid it to assume."2 An extension of this argument is
that insurance companies do not consider subrogation in setting
their actuarial rates because of the difficulty of determining the
mathematical probability of such recovery.'
Other courts have grounded the made-whole doctrine in
suretyship subrogation. In Garrity v Rural Mutual Insurance
Co,2 the court held that subrogation in insurance follows the law
of suretyship. The law of suretyship in turn dictates that a
surety, or guarantor, may not recover from the debtor until the
creditor has been made whole. To clarify the relationships, con-
sider the following example: Creditor loans $100 to Debtor;
Surety guarantees $25 of the loan, so that if Debtor defaults,
Creditor may look to Surety for payment of $25. Debtor pays
Creditor $50 and then defaults. Creditor approaches Surety, who,
pursuant to its obligation, pays Creditor $25. At this point,
Debtor owes Creditor and Surety $25 each. The made-whole doc-
trine requires that Creditor be repaid the remaining $25 owed to
him before Surety can proceed against Debtor. The parallel to the
insurance scenario is clear: the insurer may not recover from a
tortfeasor until the insured has been made whole.'
" 106 Wis 2d 263, 316 NW2d 348, 353 (1982).
2* Id.
2 Id at 355, quoting Garrity v Rural Mutual Insurance Co, 77 Wis 2d 537, 253 NW2d
512, 514 (1977).
' See Maynard v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 902 P2d 1328, 1333-
34 (Alaska 1995) (but permitting recovery because State Farm proceeded under a rein-
bursement provision that expressly precluded double recovery by the insured); Rimes, 316
NW2d at 355.
77 Wis 2d 537, 253 NW2d 512 (1977).
24 See id at 514 ("[T]here is no subrogation until the insured has been made whole.").
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2. Priority to the insurer: the pro tanto approach.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases that permit
the insurer to recover before the insured has been made whole. In
Gibson v Country Mutual Insurance Co,25 the subrogation clause
provided that the insurer would be subrogated to any recovery
from a third party to the extent of its payments. 6 The court
found no violation of public policy in allowing subrogation, even
though the insured had not been made whole. The court reasoned
that subrogation would not deprive the insured of benefits paid
for, since she only paid for coverages stated in the policy. Some
courts have stated the proposition more forcefully:
In this case, [the insurer's] policy did not agree to indemnify
[the plaintiff] for pain and suffering or disability. Yet, denial
of its [subrogation] claim ... because [the plaintiff] had not
also recovered for other elements of damage would have the
effect of making [the insurer] an insurer against those losses
as well. This would be a windfall to an insured who has not
paid for such protection."
3. The pro rata approach.
Florida once took a middle road. A Florida statute required a
pro rata splitting of the recovery from a tortfeasorY Each party
recovered an amount in proportion to the percentage of the total
loss it bore minus its pro rata share of the costs incurred in re-
covering from the tortfeasor. ° Thus, when the insured has
$10,000 of pain and suffering and the insurer has paid $5,000 of
medical expenses, the insured would take 2/3 of any recovery and
the insurer would take 1/3.3'
B. When Has the Insured Been Made Whole?
A state following the made-whole doctrine faces an immedi-
ate question: when has the insured been made whole? Courts
have given two different answers to this question. The Rimes
193 III App 3d 87, 549 NE2d 23 (1990).
Id at 24.
Id at 26.
Ludwig v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co, 393 NW2d 143, 147 (Iowa 1986).
Fla Stat Ann § 768.76(4) (West 1986 & Supp 1996). This section discusses Florida
Law prior to 1993. In 1993, Florida changed to an "insurer first" position.
3 0 Id.
" This Comment presents a simplified application of the Florida pro rats statute by
ignoring the costs of recovering from the tortfeasor. For a fuller description of the stat-
ute's intricacies, see generally Magsipoc v Larsen, 639 S2d 1038 (Fla Dist Ct App 1994).
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court held that the insured has been made whole only when he
has been compensated for all the elements of damage, not merely
those damages for which the insurer has indemnified him." The
court also held that allocation of damages to medical expenses
would be irrelevant, since a cause of action against a tortfeasor is
indivisible.3
On the other hand, in Ludwig v Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co,34 the Iowa Supreme Court held that the separate ele-
ments of a damage award can be identified and credited to the
subrogated claims, even if the insured has not been made whole
with regard to his other claims. The court reasoned that the
made-whole approach of Rimes would effectively make Farm Bu-
reau an insurer against elements of a claim, here pain and suf-
fering, for which the insured had not paid. 5
Courts confronting this issue often conduct a mini-trial to
determine whether the insured has been made whole. The
Ludwig court suggested that, if the settlement or judgment were
undifferentiated, the amount attributed to the subrogation might
have to be determined by a mini-trial." Similarly, the Rimes
court concluded that the trial court had acted appropriately in
conducting a mini-trial on whether the insured had been made
whole."
C. Explicitness of the Subrogation Priority
Though insurance contracts almost always contain terms
giving priority to the insurer, courts do not agree on how explicit
those terms must be. Most courts have held that a clause pro-
viding that the insurer "shall be subrogated... to the full extent
of the value of... [its] payments," explicitly gives first priority to
the insurer."8 But at least one court has held that similar lan-
guage was not sufficiently explicit." And at least one court has
invoked the made-whole doctrine despite a clause expressly de-
"316 NW2d at 355.
3 Id.
393 NW2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1986).
Id at 147.
Id at 146 n 2.
316 NW2d at 356 (in context of settlement).
See, for example, Higginbotham v Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 312 Ark
199, 849 SW2d 464, 465-66 (1993).
' Thiringer v American Motors Insurance Co, 91 Wash 2d 215, 588 P2d 191, 192, 194
(1978) (finding nothing in the langaage of insurance policy that altered common law
made-whole doctrine).
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signed to circumvent subrogation and its made-whole limita-
tions."
HI. DOCTRINAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS
A. The Suretyship Model
Many courts believe that the made-whole requirement is in-
herent to subrogation. The argument, usually presented with
syllogistic certainty, runs as follows: In the law of suretyship, the
creditor must be made whole before a surety may pursue a sub-
rogation claim. Insurance subrogation is based on suretyship
subrogation. Therefore, insurance subrogation requires that the
victim, the analog of the creditor, be made whole before the in-
surer may pursue its subrogation claim.4 This Section argues
that the made-whole requirement is inappropriate to the insur-
ance context. Part A shows that the doctrinal argument itself is
mistaken. Part B directs the inquiry to its proper place-risk al-
location. Finally, Part C discusses the messy difficulties of ap-
plying the made-whole doctrine.
1. Litigated claims.
As with insurance, subrogation in suretyship involves a
three party transaction. A debtor (D) borrows money from a
creditor (C). As an inducement to C to make the loan, a guaran-
tor, or surety (S), guarantees the debtor's repayment of the loan:
if D defaults, C may look to S for payment. The debtor is called
the primary obligor, the creditor is called the obligee, and the
surety is called the secondary obligor.
We begin with a simple case of suretyship, one that does not
implicate the made-whole doctrine. Assume that C lends D
$15,000, with S acting as surety for the entire amount of the
loan. D defaults, and C recovers the full $15,000 from S. Under
suretyship law, D has the primary duty to bear the cost of per-
formance. S may enforce this duty by recourse to one of four
mechanisms: enforcement of D's duty of performance, also known
as exoneration or quia timet relief; reimbursement; restitution; or
4 Powell v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 581 S2d 772, 774, 777 (Ala 1990)
(applying made-whole doctrine notwithstanding policy providing that "[s]eparate from
and in addition to the Administrator's right of subrogation... [t]he right to reimburse-
ment of the Administrator comes first even if a Member is not paid for all of his claim for
damages.").
" See text accompanying note 23.
1997] 1345
The University of Chicago Law Review
subrogation.42 Here we are interested in reimbursement and sub-
rogation.
Conceptually, reimbursement and subrogation differ with
respect to whose rights the surety seeks to enforce when pro-
ceeding against the defaulting debtor. When the surety proceeds
under a right of reimbursement, he seeks to enforce his own
rights. When the surety proceeds under subrogation, he seeks to
enforce the creditor's rights.'
In most cases the distinction makes no difference-the
surety can recover as well under subrogation as she can under
reimbursement.' Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) of Sure-
tyship and Guaranty notes several situations in which the con-
ceptual distinction creates practical differences.
First, when a surety proceeds under subrogation, he is sub-
ject to whatever defenses the principal obligor has against the
obligee; under reimbursement he is subject only to those defenses
of which he had notice.' Second, under subrogation, the surety is
subject to the statute of limitations on the creditor's claim; under
reimbursement, he is subject only to the independent statute of
limitations on his own claim, which will typically not have run
until after the statute of limitations has run on the creditor's
claim.4" Third, whereas the surety is not entitled to subrogation
until the creditor has been made whole, the right of reimburse-
ment contains no such requirement. In other words, the made-
whole doctrine does not apply to the right of reimbursement. The
surety "has a right of reimbursement even if its performance of
the secondary obligation is only partial or if the underlying obli-
gation is otherwise not totally discharged by [its] performance."47
Finally, under subrogation, the surety succeeds to the priority
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 18 at 81 (1996).
Id § 28, comment c at 121.
SId.
Id at 121-22. See also § 24.
Assume that on January 1, Debtor borrows $1,000 from Creditor; Surety guaran-
tees the loan. On February 1, Debtor defaults, and on September 1, Surety pays Creditor.
If Surety proceeds under subrogation, he is enforcing Creditor's cause of action, which
arose at the time of the breach, on February 1. If, on the other hand, Surety proceeds un-
der the right of reimbursement, he is bringing his own cause of action, which arises on
September 1, when he pays Creditor. The statute of limitations on the reimbursement
claim in this hypothetical thus expires seven months later than the subrogation claim.
See id at § 28, comment c at 122. This may turn out to be the most important reason for
resolving subrogation priorities. While an insurer will usually be able to circumvent the
made-whole doctrine by resorting to reimbursement rather than subrogation, this option
is foreclosed when the statute of limitations has run on its own claim, as may be the case
in the tobacco litigation. See text accompanying note 3.
" Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 28, comment c at 122.
48Id.
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and secured status of the creditor. Under reimbursement, on the
other hand, the priority of the surety's claim dates from the time
that the debtor's obligation transfers to him. Furthermore, his
claim does not take on whatever secured status the creditor may
have had.48
Now, consider two patterns of suretyship that do implicate
the made-whole doctrine. In what we will call the solvent debtor
pattern, assume that C lends D $15,000, with S acting as surety
for $5,000. D defaults, and C recovers the $5,000 guaranteed by
S. Naturally, C proceeds against D for the remaining $10,000,
and S proceeds against D for the $5,000 on which he was only
secondarily liable. So far, this scenario precisely parallels the
original tale of the tortfeasor, the victim, and insurer.49 S must
decide whether to proceed under reimbursement or under subro-
gation. Assuming that D is solvent, S has no reason to proceed
under subrogation, and every reason not to. Under reimburse-
ment, S may recover his $5,000 from D, without regard to
whether C has been made whole. Under subrogation, however, S
cannot recover his $5,000 until C has recovered his $10,000.50
But now assume that D is not solvent. In what we will call
the insolvent debtor pattern, C again loans $15,000 to D, this
time taking a perfected security interest in D's manufacturing
equipment, which is worth $12,000. D has additional property
worth $3,000. As an inducement to C to loan the funds, S guar-
antees $5,000 of the loan.51 Assume further that D has two other
unsecured creditors to whom he owes $3,000 each. D defaults
and files for bankruptcy. The question is the same as that posed
at the beginning of this Comment: as between S and C, who gets
priority?
This pattern plays out very differently than the previous
one. C will successfully exercise his $12,000 security interest in
the manufacturing equipment, and will recover the remaining
$3,000 from S, pursuant to the suretyship agreement. S will then
want to recover his $3,000 from D. If S proceeds under his right
of reimbursement, his claim will be unsecured, and he will share
equally in the remaining $3,000 with the other unsecured credi-
See introduction to this Comment.
Some courts embrace the made-whole doctrine because they find the idea of the in-
sured and surety competing for the tortfeasor's funds to be repugnant. See, for example,
Garrity, 253 NW2d at 514. See also Restatement of Suretyship § 27, comment b at 113-
14. But there appears to be no such repugnancy in suretyship when the surety proceeds
against the debtor under his right of reimbursement while simultaneously the creditor
sues on the primary obligation.
51 While the loan is over-collateralized, this may be due to risks in the fluctuating
value of the collateral.
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tors, recovering only $1,000.2 If there were no made-whole re-
quirement for subrogation, S would choose to proceed under sub-
rogation instead of reimbursement, since by doing so he would
acquire a secured status identical to C's and share in the pro-
ceeds of the manufacturing equipment.53
This scenario explains why a surety may not claim subroga-
tion until the creditor has been made whole.5 4 Subrogation per-
mits the surety to "step into the shoes" of the creditor. Here, this
would mean that S is not relegated to sharing equally with the
other unsecured creditors; instead he competes with C for the
manufacturing equipment. And, following the rules of subroga-
tion, S's interest in the secured asset would be equal to C's in
every respect.55 S and C would therefore share pro rata in the
collateral,56 with C receiving $9,600 and S receiving $2,400."7
Such a result was specifically not intended by the parties,
and the doctrine of subrogation properly precludes it. To see why,
we must unpack the transaction. The parties intended that if D
should default, C would lose nothing, recovering $12,000 from his
security interest and up to $5,000 from S. S's guaranty was to be
an inducement to C to loan D the funds. Presumably, if S had not
agreed to act as a surety, C would either not have agreed to the
loan, or would have demanded a higher interest rate, compen-
sating for the riskier nature that the loan now assumed. S, on
the other hand, agreed to assume the risk that, in the event that
D were to default, C's security interest in the collateral would not
be sufficient to cover D's outstanding debt to C. S agreed to make
See UCC §§ 9-301, 9-302, 9-312 (ALI 1996).
See Restatement of Suretyship § 28(1)(c) and comment e at 123-24.
Id § 27 at 113-14 (reporting that a surety may not proceed under subrogation until
the underlying obligation to the obligee has been fully satisfied).
See id § 28(1) ("To the extent that the secondary obligor is subrogated to the rights
of the obligee, the secondary obligor may enforce, for its benefit, the rights of the obli-
gee."). See also id § 29 ("Except as provided by statute, when a secondary obligor is subro-
gated to rights of the obligee, the secondary obligor has the same priority with respect to
those rights as the obligee.").
"Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not seem to cover this precise sce-
nario. See generally § 9-312, and particularly § 9-312(5): "In all cases not governed by
other rules... priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall
be determined according to the following rules: (a) Conflicting security interests rank ac-
cording to priority in time of filing or perfection." Here the priorities would date from the
same time, so § 9-312 is of no help. That § 9-312 does not address this situation makes
sense, since this sort of equal priority in the same collateral is exactly what Article 9 was
designed to prevent.
' S and C would share pro rata in the collateral, along the same lines as UCC § 9-
315(2). Here, C loaned D $15,000 and recovered $3,000 from S, for a net loss of $12,000; S
is out $3,000. They would then share in the collateral in the same proportion that their
losses bear to the total loss: 12115 = 415, and 3/15 = 1/5, so C would receive $9,600 (4/5 *
12) and S would receive $2,400 (1/5 * 12,000).
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up the shortfall precisely so that C would not have to compete
with the other unsecured creditors. S may have been able to take
steps to protect himself: under the facts of this scenario, he could
have taken a security interest in D's remaining assets. And even
if he could not have protected himself, he agreed to the terms of
his suretyship. Perhaps S was compensated for his guaranty;
perhaps he merely offered his guaranty as a friend to D. Either
way, the intentions of the parties at the outset of the transaction
were abundantly clear.
The made-whole doctrine gives effect to these intentions.
Without the made-whole requirement, S and C would share the
risk of D's insolvency, depriving C of the benefit of his security
interest. That would thwart the parties' intent, twisting it be-
yond recognition. To avoid this result, the law of suretyship re-
quires that a surety seeking to recover under subrogation wait
until the obligee for whom he is a surety has been made whole.5"
C will receive his $12,000 from the security interest, and S must
proceed under his right of reimbursement and take his chances
with the other unsecured creditors, as the parties originally in-
tended.
Returning to insurance subrogation, we now ask whether the
solvent debtor pattern or the insolvent debtor pattern best fits
the scenario in which the insured victim recovers less than his
full damages from the tortfeasor. Asked another way, how well
does the doctrine of subrogation, which originated in suretyship,
translate to tort insurance?
At first blush, the dynamics in suretyship and insurance are
simply too different for us to apply the former to the latter. In
suretyship, all three parties entered into a consensual agree-
ment, their intentions clear to one another and a court sitting in
judgment. In tort insurance, on the other hand, the primary obli-
gor-the tortfeasor-is not a party to the agreement at all; the
only agreement is a contract between the insured and the in-
surer, and the tort giving rise to the dispute is not consensual at
all.
But this difference is chimerical. In suretyship, the only
agreement that makes a difference is the one that exists between
the secondary obligor-the surety-and the obligee-the creditor.
The debtor makes only a passive, background contribution to the
dynamic: it is the debtor's borrowing that gives rise to the sure-
tyship, and in the event of default it is his assets that will be
looked to for ultimate satisfaction of at least part of the debt. For
' See Restatement of Suretyship § 27 and comment b at 113-14.
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purposes of subrogation, however, the debtor himself is not im-
portant to the transaction. The surety and the creditor-the sec-
ondary obligor and the obligee-are the players here, and the
game is one of risk allocation: who bears how much of the risk
that the debtor will default?
The insurance context presents a similar scenario. The in-
sured plays the part of the creditor or obligee, the victim to whom
the tortfeasor will owe the debt. The insurer is the secondary ob-
ligor, the entity that will pay the "creditor" if the primary obligor
does not. And, of course, the tortfeasor plays the part of the pri-
mary obligor or debtor. Here, as in suretyship, the obligee (in-
sured) and the secondary obligor (insurer) will agree to a risk al-
location without the participation of the primary obligor.
But instead of looking for differences between suretyship
and tort insurance, consider for a moment their similarities. Both
involve three parties, both involve consensual risk allocation, and
both involve a creditor who has not been made whole by his
debtor. If they are similar, why not treat them similarly? In tort
insurance, as in suretyship, the insurer may proceed against the
primary obligor either by subrogation, or by right of reimburse-
ment. Recall that while subrogation requires that the subrogor be
made whole before the subrogee can step into his shoes, the right
of reimbursement carries no such requirement. If we are true to
the suretyship model, the insurer has a right to be reimbursed by
the tortfeasor, regardless of whether the insured has been made
whole. Only if the insurer proceeds under subrogation should the
made-whole doctrine limit recovery.
When the insured has not been made whole, the insurer will
proceed under its right of reimbursement if it possibly can. The
question then becomes whether some factor precludes the insurer
from proceeding under a right of reimbursement, as it did in the
insolvent debtor pattern.59 Or, to return to the question as origi-
nally framed: is tort insurance more like the first or second pat-
terns discussed in suretyship?0
The insurance scenario has much in common with the insol-
vent debtor pattern of suretyship. In both cases, the obligee has
not been made whole. In both cases, ignoring the made-whole
doctrine means that the secondary obligor, who is enforcing a
right of the obligee, may compete with the obligee for the debtor's
assets. It seems as odd in insurance as it does in suretyship that
See text accompanying notes 51-52.
'o See the first pattern at text accompanying notes 49-50, and the second pattern at
text accompanying notes 51-52.
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a secondary obligor could enforce the obligee's rights to the det-
riment of that same obligee. In both contexts, the law conceives
of the obligee telling the secondary obligor, "You may succeed to
my rights against the debtor, but not if it means hurting me in
the process." The opposite scenario conjures up the image of
shooting a man with his own gun.
Imagery aside, when considered together, reimbursement
and subrogation in the suretyship context serve to allocate the
risks of insolvency, that is, who takes his chances with the unse-
cured creditors. The examples in the comments to Sections 27
and 28 of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty
deal with insolvency and security interests." When there is no
insolvency or security interest, the surety does not need to stand
in the creditor's shoes, may proceed under reimbursement, and
may recover from the debtor even if the creditor has not recov-
ered in full. When the debtor is insolvent, however, the surety
will need the benefit of the creditor's security interest. The
surety will therefore prefer to proceed under subrogation and so
will need to wait until the creditor has been made whole.
In contrast to suretyship, the issue in insurance has nothing
to do with security interests. If the insured has not been made
whole because of an inadequate jury verdict, the issue is not who
takes his chances along with the unsecured creditors. That issue
is resolved. No one does. Even if the tortfeasor has assets not
subject to a security interest, the creditor could not reach them.
If, on the other hand, the insured has not been made whole be-
cause the tortfeasor is insolvent and has insufficient insurance,
the insurer is no better off seeking recovery under subrogation
than it is under reimbursement, unless, of course, the insured
victim had the foresight to take a security interest in the tortfea-
sor's property before the accident."
Under the suretyship model, the surety/subrogee is never
limited to either reimbursement or subrogation; it may always
choose one or the other, and will do so depending on the advan-
tages of the different causes of action. In the insurance context,
therefore, when the tortfeasor is solvent and the insurer does not
need to resort to subrogation, the insurer should not be limited to
recovery subject to the limitations of subrogation. Rather, the in-
surer should be entitled to proceed under reimbursement, and
therefore without regard to whether the insured has been made
6 See Restatement of Suretyship § 27, comment b, illustration 4 at 155 and § 28,
comment e at 123-24.
' A tort victim is not automatically considered a secured creditor. See UCC §§ 9-
301(3), 9-312,9-104.
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whole. Even if the tortfeasor is insolvent, the insurer gains
nothing by proceeding under subrogation: the victim is not likely
to have a security interest in the tortfeasor's assets. By exten-
sion, the insurer should also be able to recover its outlays from
an insured who has recovered from the tortfeasor.
2. Settlement.
So far we have adhered rather closely to the suretyship
model. In the litigated claims discussed above, the model is rela-
tively simple and translates cleanly to the insurance context. But
when the tortfeasor and the insured settle their claims without a
verdict, the analysis becomes more complex.
Assume that C loans $15,000 to D, and, as an incentive to C
to make the loan, S acts as surety for $5,000 of the loan. D de-
faults and C recovers $5,000 from S. D and C enter into a settle-
ment agreement wherein C agrees to release D's obligation in ex-
change for $7,000.
Under the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty,
D is discharged from his obligations to S, unless the terms of the
release provide otherwise."3 If the terms of the settlement allow
S's rights to continue against D, S may recover from D under
reimbursement or subrogation, just as it would have had C not
released D."
If, however, C releases D and does not provide that S's rights
continue against D, then S may not recover from D.6" When S has
already paid C, S's rights of reimbursement and subrogation
against D are destroyed, and S would suffer a loss. While con-
tract law recognizes a third party beneficiary, nowhere does it
recognize a third party "maleficiary": although two parties may
enter into a binding agreement that one will pay money to a
third party, they may not bind a third party to pay one of them,
absent his consent. Similarly, in suretyship, if C and D can agree
that S may not recover his losses, they are making S a third
party maleficiary. Suretyship countenances this no more than
contract law does: when an obligee impairs the surety's right of
reimbursement or subrogation, the surety has a claim against
the obligee.6"
Restatement of Suretyship § 39(a). Section 38(1) provides that the release effects a
"preservation of the secondary obligor's recourse" only if the release explicitly provides
that C retains the right to recover from S and that S's rights against D continue as
though the release had not been granted.
6 Id § 38(2).
Id § 39(a).
Id § 37(3)-(4). This result is reached through the interaction of two sections of the
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The tort insurance analog parallels this fact pattern. Tort-
feasor injures Insured, who sustains $15,000 of damages, $5,000
of which are damages covered by Insurer. Insurer pays Insured
the $5,000. Insured and Tortfeasor then enter into a settlement
agreement under which Insured agrees to release Tortfeasor in
exchange for $7,000. Under a strict application of suretyship law,
Insurer would no longer be able to recover his $5,000 from Tort-
feasor, and so is impaired to that extent. Insurer should there-
fore have a cause of action against Insured for the $5,000.
This result is intuitively attractive: there is no reason that a
tortfeasor and his victim should be able to reach an agreement
that harms the insurer. If this were not the rule, tortfeasor and
the victim could choose to settle, avoiding the uncertainty of a
trial at the expense of the insurer. Oddly, courts have applied the
made-whole doctrine in the tort settlement context, essentially
allowing insureds to exchange their insurers' rights of recovery
against tortfeasors for low transaction cost settlements."7
3. Freedom of contract.
Under suretyship law, the rights among the parties may be
varied by contract. As the Restatement reports, "Each rule in
this Restatement stating the effect of suretyship status may be
varied by contract between the parties subject to it."6"
The only limitations that the Restatement places on such
agreements are those imposed by contract law, such as good faith
and unconscionability.6 9 The reporter's note states that "[t]he ex-
istence of the parties' power to order their relationship is usually
assumed. Litigation in this area typically relates to the terms of
the parties' agreement rather than to their power to agree." °
Restatement. Section 39(d) provides that to the extent that the obligee releases the
debtor from the obligation, the surety has a claim against the obligee to the extent pro-
vided in Section 37(4). Section 37(4) provides that if the obligee "impairs the [surety's]
suretyship status" after the surety performs any part of this suretyship obligation, the
surety has a claim against the obligee to the extent that such impairment would have
discharged the [surety]. Section 37(1) defines impairment as, inter alia, decreasing the
surety's potential ability to cause the debtor to bear the cost of performance. Thus, had
the creditor not released the debtor from the $15,000 obligation, the debtor would have
had to repay the full amount of the loan, and the surety would not have had to pay the
$5,000. The surety therefore has a $5,000 claim against the creditor. See also id § 37,
comment d, illustration 1 at 161.
' These courts have required a mini-trial to determine whether the insured has been
made whole. See text accompanying notes 36-37.
Restatement of Suretyship § 6.
Id § 6, comment b at 29.
Id § 6, reporter's note at 30.
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There is thus nothing within suretyship subrogation that pre-
cludes contracting around the made-whole doctrine.
In summary, there is no purely doctrinal justification for in-
voking the made-whole doctrine every time an insurer seeks to
recover its outlays. Rather, the made-whole doctrine properly
applies only when the insurer proceeds under subrogation
proper, when it seeks to enforce its insured's rights against the
tortfeasor.
B. Risk Allocation
The previous section showed that a purely doctrinal justifi-
cation for the made-whole doctrine is unwarranted. This section
returns to the more basic economic considerations. Deciding what
law should apply without understanding the economics of insur-
ance is the equivalent of determining chess moves by rolling dice.
We therefore turn now to risk allocation, which lies at the heart
of the priority issue. It is the party that recovers last that bears
the risk of an incomplete recovery from the tortfeasor.
Along these lines, several courts have approached the prior-
ity issue from the perspective of giving the parties the benefit of
their bargain. Courts adopting the made-whole doctrine assert
that the insurer should bear the loss of an incomplete recovery
because "that is a risk the insured has paid it to assume."7' Some
courts have gone even further in asserting that insurance com-
panies do not include subrogation in their actuarial computations
because the probability is too difficult to calculate.7"
On the other side of the debate, courts adopting a pro tanto
rule assert that an insured has received the benefit of his bar-
gain. For example, the Appellate Court of Illinois in Gibson v
Country Mutual Insurance Co asserted that the insured "paid for
the coverages stated in the policy, subject to the conditions stated
in the policy."73
Ironically, both approaches misapprehend the essential
workings of insurance and actuarial rate setting. Insurance com-
panies can take subrogation into account in setting their rates, at
least in setting health insurance rates.74 There is no reason to as-
71 Powell v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 581 S2d 772, 776 (Ala 1990) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted).
"See generally Allstate Insurance Co v Druke, 118 Ariz 301, 576 P2d 489, 492 (1978);
DeCespedes v Prudence Mutual Casualty Co of Chicago, Ill, 193 S2d 224, 227-28 (Fla Dist
Ct App 1966); Cooper v Argonaut Insurance Companies, 556 P2d 525, 527 (Alaska 1976).
193 M App 3d 87, 549 NE2d 23, 26 (1990).
Harry L. Sutton, Jr. and Allen J. Sorbo, Actuarial Issues in the Fee-For-
Service/Prepaid Medical Group 46 (Center for Research in Ambulatory Healthcare
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sume that any other area of insurance is any different. But this
is incidental. An insurance company sets its rates based on his-
torical net costs.' 5 Thus, if the insurer had one hundred policy-
holders in the experience period, and experienced a total of
$20,000 in claim costs, it will set its actuarial premiums at $200
per policy holder.76 If, on the other hand, the insurance company
experienced $20,000 in claim costs and received $5,000 in subro-
gation, it will set its actuarial premiums at $150 per policy
holder. Thus, whether the insurer lists subrogation as a factor in
its actuarial calculations is irrelevant; it is implicitly included.
This analysis suggests that the term included in the contract
does not determine whether the insured is paying the insurer to
assume the risk of an incomplete recovery. If the insured lives in
a jurisdiction that has adopted the pro tanto rule, then he is
paying a lower premium, reflecting the insurer's subrogation re-
covery. If, on the other hand, the insured lives in a jurisdiction
that has adopted the made-whole doctrine, then he is paying a
higher premium, reflecting the insurer's diminished subrogation
recovery.
77
This does not mean that a jurisdiction should never change
its status quo because doing so would grant a windfall to one
party or the other. Dislocation is incident to any change in a legal
rule, and may be justified in the long run despite temporary in-
equities. Adherence to the status quo is particularly unjustified
in the insurance context because, once the actuaries know that
the legal rule has changed, they can project the changes in costs
from subrogation recovery.7
It should therefore be clear that insurance companies are ut-
terly indifferent as to which rule is adopted, since they can al-
ways spread their risks among their policyholders. Whether a
court adopts a pro tanto regime or a made-whole regime, the in-
surance company will take care of itself. Courts should therefore
Admin 2d ed 1993) ("An adjustment to estimated total HMO expenses ... should be in-
cluded to project the impact of coordination of benefits, workers' compensation, and sub-
rogation.") (emphasis added). See also Letter from Dean K. Lamb, Senior Actuary for All-
state Insurance Company, to Jeffirey A. Greenblatt, Jan 30, 1997 ("Lamb letter") (on file
with U Chi L Rev).
' Telephone interview with Dean K. Lamb, Senior Actuary for Allstate Insurance
Company, Jan 27, 1997. See also Lamb letter.
:' This assumes what are termed actuarially fair rates, which means that the insur-
ance company does not allow for profit and administration expenses in this model.
' Under a pro rata regime, the result falls somewhere in between. While pro rata
sharing does reimburse the insurer for outlays, it does not do so fully, driving premiums
higher than in apro tanto regime but not so high as in a made-whole regime.
' See Lamb letter (cited in note 74).
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not focus on contract terms or on whether the insured is actually
paying for subrogation priority, but on risk allocation.
Yet analyzing risk allocation is particularly problematic in
this context, for two normal presumptions of risk allocation ap-
pear to conflict. In risk allocation, we begin with the presumption
that when one party is risk-averse 9 and the other is risk-
neutral," the risk-neutral party is the better risk bearer, and the
parties should allocate the risk to him. This is particularly easy
to see in the insurance context. An insurance company is para-
digmatically risk-neutral because its very business is the
spreading of risk. The insured, on the other hand, is paradig-
matically risk-averse: otherwise he would not purchase insur-
ance. Because a risk-averse individual is willing to pay more
than the expected value of the loss to avoid it, both parties are
better off allocating the risk to the insurance company.81 Given
this presumption, we would expect to see the parties agree to al-
locate the risk of an incomplete recovery to the insurance com-
pany; the insurance company should recover only after the in-
sured had been made whole.
A second presumption runs in the opposite direction. This
presumption-freedom of contract-stands for the proposition
that, left to themselves, parties will find the optimal risk alloca-
tion. "Irrationality is usually in the mind of the beholder, not in
the mind of the beheld."82
It is somewhat surprising, then, that insurance policies so
uniformly provide that the insurer take priority,83 which means
that the insured bears the residual risk of an incomplete recovery
from a tortfeasor. The presumptions presented above are not
conclusive, however, and there are many reasons why the parties
may choose an alternative risk allocation. Any explanation for
why the parties would agree to allocate the risk to the insured is
also an argument for the pro tanto regime.
' A person is risk-averse if he prefers a 100 percent chance of a $10 loss to a 10 per-
cent chance of losing $100. In other words, he cares "not only about the expected value" of
an accident, "but also about the absolute magnitude of the risk." A. Mitchell Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 53 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1989).
A party is risk-neutral if he is indifferent between a 10 percent chance of losing
$100 and a 100 percent chance of losing $10. In other words, he cares only about the po-
tential gain or loss multiplied by the probability of the gain or loss occurring. Id at 29.
8' See id at 54-55.
Russell L. Ackoff, The Art of Problem Solving 35 (Wiley & Sons 1978).
See note 4 and accompanying text for examples.
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1. Risk avoidance.
One reason that the parties may choose an alternative
scheme of risk allocation is that one party may be in a better po-
sition to avoid the risk in the first place." For example, assume
that Shipper and Miller enter into an agreement that Shipper
will deliver Miller's broken millshaft to the manufacturer for re-
pairs.85 There is a danger that Shipper's ship could break down
and delay the repairs. The delay will cost Miller $100 and has a
50 percent chance of occurring, but Shipper can exercise care
(costing $5) in maintaining his ship and reduce the chance of de-
lay to 10 percent. Miller can do nothing to reduce the probability
of delay. Thus, the expected cost of the delay is (.1 * 100) = $10 if
Shipper exercises care and (.5 * 100) = $50 if he does not. The
parties can agree that Miller will pay a premium to Shipper, who
will then assume the risk of the delay by agreeing to compensate
Miller in the event of a delay. Having assumed the risk, Shipper
has an incentive to maintain his ship, and the expected cost of
the delay is reduced. As long as Miller pays Shipper between $5
and $10, both are better off than if Shipper exercises no care and
Miller has an expected loss of $50.
As between Insurer and Insured, Insured is clearly in a bet-
ter position to avoid an accident; Insurer can do nothing at all.
We might therefore think that the parties would allocate the risk
to the Insured, in return for which Insurer would "pay" Insured-
in the form of a reduced premium. The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that it assumes Insured does not already have sufficient
incentives to exercise care and avoid injury. If he does, then there
is no reason to allocate more risk to him to induce him to do what
he is already doing.
To make this argument convincing, then, one would have to
explain why the contributory negligence system does not already
provide sufficient incentives to take care. A possible explanation
is that the existence of insurance lessens Insured's incentives to
exercise care, since he will no longer bear the loss in the event of
an injury. This phenomenon is called a moral hazard.86
There are two difficulties with this explanation. First, it ig-
nores the fact that Insured already has incentives to take care. If
he is injured, he incurs pain and suffering, as well as other dam-
ages for which he is not insured. He may also have a deductible
' See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.5 at 104 (Little, Brown 4th ed
1992).
The facts are loosely based on Hadley v Baxendale, 156 Eng Rep 145 (Ex 1854).
Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 56 (cited in note 79).
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or co-insurance, which should eliminate, or at least minimize, the
risk of insufficient precautions.8 7 Second, to the extent that In-
surer believes that the current deductibles and copayments do
not eliminate the moral hazard, it is difficult to see why allocat-
ing the risk of incomplete recovery to Insured would be an effi-
cient solution. This risk allocation is a stochastic deductible, im-
posed at random when the recovery is not complete. If an addi-
tional deductible is necessary, it is difficult to understand why it
would not be simpler to raise the flat deductible.
2. Litigation incentives.
In fact, the risk to be avoided by this allocation is not the ac-
cident, but an incomplete recovery from the tortfeasor. Here the
incentive argument hits home. A recovery from the tortfeasor de-
pends upon the litigation efforts of both insurer and insured. It
makes sense to allocate the risk to the party whose participation
is most important to recovering the last dollar. Often the insurer
runs the litigation, providing expertise and a legal staff experi-
enced in tort litigation.88 The insured is contractually bound to
assist with the preparation and presentation of the case.89 But
even if an insured is forced to participate, he may not have an in-
centive to do a good job. If he does not want to testify, he will
seek during depositions and on the witness stand to dispose of
the case as quickly as possible, rather than making an effort to
appear as a sympathetic plaintiff. It therefore makes sense to
allocate the risk of an incomplete recovery to him: if he does not
do a good job, he will not recover.
At first blush, this argument should apply with equal force
to the insurer: by allocating the risk to the insured, the insurer
may no longer have a sufficient incentive to prepare the case
properly. There is, however, a difference between the insurer and
the insured. Unlike the insured, the insurer and its attorneys are
repeat players in the insurance and litigation game, and as such
would suffer substantial reputational consequences for doing a
poor job. If the insurer hires private tort lawyers to present the
case and the lawyers do a poor job, they will not be retained in
the future. To the extent that the insurer develops a poor track
record in winning cases-and therefore recoveries-for its cli-
ents, word will get out and its client base will diminish.
See id at 57.
Telephone interview with Dean Lamb (cited in note 75).
Lamb letter (cited in note 74).
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3. Pure risk aversion.
Though appealing and intuitive, the foregoing incentive ar-
guments circle wide of the point. The most convincing argument
for a pro tanto regime focuses purely and squarely on risk aver-
sion.
One reason that an insured may prefer to bear the risk of an
incomplete recovery is that by doing so he ultimately bears less
risk. Assume that an insured has a policy with a $500 limit and
that an accident with a probability of 5 percent will cause $1,000
in damages. Assume further that there is a 10 percent probabil-
ity of a full $1,000 recovery from the tortfeasor, a 30 percent
probability of a $500 recovery, and a 60 percent probability of a
$100 recovery. This tracks our intuitions that it is easier to re-
cover the first dollar than the last.
When the insurer bears the risk of an incomplete recovery,
the premium will be $22.50. 0 If, on the other hand, the insured
bears the risk of an incomplete recovery, the premium will be
only $13.50 for the $500 policy." For $22.50 he can now purchase
a policy with a $700 limit.92 If he chooses to spend the $22.50, he
faces a maximum loss of $266.67 when he buys $733.33 of insur-
ance and bears the risk of an incomplete recovery, as opposed to
a maximum loss of $500 if he buys the $500 of insurance and
does not bear the risk of recovery. Recall that a risk-averse per-
son considers not only the expected cost of a loss, but also its ab-
solute magnitude.9 3 Since $266.67 is less than $500, a truly risk-
averse person will choose to spend the same money to buy a
larger policy and assume the risk of an incomplete recovery.'
' .05[.1(0) + .3(500) + .6(500)] = 22.5. The premiums are set according to the expected
cost (probability * magnitude) to the insurer. The insurer only pays out if there is an ac-
cident, which happens with a probability of .05. Even when there is an accident, there is a
probability of .1 that the insurer will lose nothing because there will be a full recovery
from the tortfeasor. Regardless of the priority regime, all jurisdictions agree that the in-
surer is entitled to subrogation where the insured is made whole. Next, there is a prob-
ability of .3 that there will be a $500 recovery from tortfeasor. Under the made-whole re-
gime contemplated by this illustration, the insurer would not recover any of the $500 paid
out to the insured. Finally, there is a probability of .6 that there will be a $100 recovery
from the tortfeasor. Again, this will cost the insurer $500 since the made-whole doctrine
will channel recovery from the tortfeasor to the insured. This model assumes actuarially
fair rates, or rates that are set so that the insurance company makes no profit. A richer
model, incorporating a profit margin, would be more complicated without changing the
result.
.05[.1(0) + .3(0) + .6(400)] = 12.0.
.05[.1(0) + .3(x - 400) + .6(x - 100)] = 22.5; x = 733.33.
Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 53 (cited in note 79).
Nonpecuniary damages such as pain and suffering constitute an important varia-
tion on this theme. Pain and suffering insurance is not available, and there is some de-
bate in the academic literature about whether people would purchase the insurance if it
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C. Strategic Behavior and Transaction Costs
A court applying the made-whole doctrine to the insurance
context must determine whether the insured has been made
whole. In this respect, insurance law differs greatly from surety-
ship. In suretyship subrogation the amount of the loan is fixed,
and damages are easy to compute. Therefore, when A loans B
$15,000 with C acting as surety, it is clear that once A has re-
ceived his $15,000, thus having been made whole, subrogation
will grant A's right of action against B to C. This prevents A from
receiving more than his $15,000, and places the ultimate burden
on B. In insurance subrogation, however, the mechanics are not
as straightforward. Even defining the term "made whole" is diffi-
cult.
One possible definition is that an accident victim is made
whole only when he has received the full compensation he sought
from the tortfeasor. But this definition constitutes an open invi-
tation to strategic behavior that could eviscerate subrogation al-
together: by seeking an unreasonably large amount of money
from the tortfeasor, an insured victim could obtain a double re-
covery.9
5
Returning to the original example, suppose that A has been
injured in an automobile accident, incurring $5,000 of medical
expenses for which he is reimbursed by his insurance carrier. He
believes that he has also sustained $10,000 of pain and suffering.
He also believes that a jury will award him a maximum of
$15,000 (even if he sues for more). He must now decide how
much money to seek from the tortfeasor. Assume he sues the
tortfeasor for $15,000--the actual amount of his damages. If he
were. For the argument against insurance for pain and suffering, see generally Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L J
353, 361-67 (1988). But see Steven P. Croley and Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv L Rev 1785 (1995). It is
not the purpose of this Comment to rehash these arguments or weigh their merits. Two
observations suffice for our purposes. First, to the extent that Professor Schwartz is cor-
rect-and people would not purchase insurance against pain and suffering--courts should
not apply the made-whole doctrine in cases when pain and suffering account for why the
insured has not been made whole, as in the example in the beginning of this Comment.
Second, to the extent that some people would prefer to purchase insurance against pain
and suffering while others would not, the made-whole doctrine creates cross-
subsidization, which should usually be avoided.
Pro rata sharing, while reducing the risk of double recovery, does not eliminate this
possibility. Furthermore, under pro rata sharing neither party has as much to gain from
pursuing the tortfeasor as it does in either the pro tanto or made-whole regimes. Neither
party captures all of the benefits of its efforts, and both may suffer from a collective ac-
tion problem. If neither brings suit, then the ultimate loss rests on the parties, rather
than the tortfeasor, and this may give tortfeasors insufficient incentives to exercise care
in avoiding accidents in the first place.
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recovers the full $15,000, subrogation will require him to give
$5,000 to his insurance carrier. If, however, he sues the tortfea-
sor for a larger amount, such as $20,000, and recovers the same
$15,000, he has not been "made whole" and keeps the full
$15,000. Since the insurer has already reimbursed him for his
medical expenses, he has achieved a double recovery: $15,000 for
$10,000 of remaining damages.
A similar scenario arises if the insured victim believes that a
jury will award him any amount more than $10,000 but less than
$15,000. Assume that he believes a jury will award him $12,000
(even if he sues for more than $15,000). When he recovers the
$12,000, subrogation will require him to give $2,000 to his insur-
ance carrier. But if he sues for $20,000, claiming $15,000 of pain
and suffering, then an award of $12,000 has not made him whole,
and he keeps the full $12,000. Since his insurer has reimbursed
him for $5,000, he has only $10,000 of remaining damages; again,
he has achieved a double recovery. Therefore, whether an in-
sured has been made whole must not be determined with refer-
ence to the amount he has sought from the tortfeasor.
To illustrate this point, consider the following hypothetical
(diagramed in Figure 1): Tortfeasor has acted negligently, caus-
ing Insured $10 pain and suffering damages and $5 in medical
damages, as in the example above. Insurer reimburses Insured
for the medical expenses. A lawsuit costs $3, and in the suit
against Tortfeasor, Insurer will pay $1 and Insured will pay $2,
in proportion to their expected returns. Insured has a choice of
three moves: he may decide not to sue Tortfeasor at all, or he
may sue Tortfeasor for either $15 or $20. Insurer has two
choices: participate in the suit and share in the expenses and re-
wards, or do not participate in the suit. After Insured success-
fully sues Tortfeasor,96 Insurer must decide whether to pursue its
subrogation claim against Insured, and Insured must decide
whether to defend himself against the suit. Again, a full lawsuit
costs each party $3, and even if Insured decides not to defend,
the process of bringing the suit costs Insurer $1.
' The model assumes that a suit against the tortfeasor will be successful with prob-
ability one. While choosing an appropriate probability of success would make the model
richer, it would not alter the relative payoffs in any way. Furthermore, the model as de-
veloped shows the best-case scenario; by reducing the probability of a successful suit, we
only reduce the expected payoff, and provide even less of an incentive for Insurer to press
its subrogation claim against Insured.
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Insured
O don't sue tortfeasor
Insure
-lo 0
(-10, -5)
don't
participate part
and
subrc
(2, -5)
defend
(-5, -4)
participate and don't participate and
ipate dont pursue participate parti ipate don't pursuepursue subrogation and pursue subrogation
subr tion
Insured
* 000
(3, -6) (2, -5) (3, -6)
don't don't
defend defend defend
(-2, -2) (0, -10) (-3, -2)
Payoffs: Insured, Insurer
Figure 1
Insured begins the game with -$15. The players in this game
move sequentially: when Insurer decides whether to pursue its
subrogation claim, it knows whether Insured has sued Tortfeasor
for $20, $15, or not at all. Similarly, when Insured decides
whether to defend against Insurer's claim, he knows whether In-
surer has decided to pursue its subrogation claim.
Backward induction shows that Insured's dominant strat-
egy" is to sue Tortfeasor for $20, and that Insurer's best response
is not to participate in Insured's suit against Tortfeasor. Insured
is always better off suing than not suing: if he does not sue, he is
left with a payoff of -$10 (his pain and suffering, since Insurer
' A dominant strategy is the strategy "that is a best choice for a player in a game for
every possible choice by the other player." Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and
Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 306 (Harvard 1994).
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has reimbursed him for his medical expenses); whereas if he sues
his worst payoff is -$5.
Insured is worse off suing for $15 than suing for $20. If In-
sured sues for $15, he has been made whole and must return $5
to Insurer. Insurer will know that Insured has sued Tortfeasor
for $15, and will pursue its subrogation claim, since it is always
better off doing so (-$4 > -$6 and -$2 > -$6). Insured will lose if he
defends against the subrogation claim, and the defense will still
cost him an additional $3, leaving him with a net payoff of -$5
(= -$15 + $5 + $15 - $5 - $2 - $3). Insured does better in this sub-
game by paying Insurer without raising a defense and reaping a
net payoff of-$2 (= -$15 + $5 - $2 + $15 - $5).
On the other hand, if Insured sues for $20 and receives $15,
he has not been made whole. Any attempt by Insurer to pursue
its subrogation claim would therefore fail. If Insurer pursues its
subrogation claim, Insured's best response is to defend ($0 > -$2).
Insurer knows this, and is thus faced with the choice of not pur-
suing its subrogation claim and a payoff of -$6, or pursuing its
subrogation claim and a payoff of -$10 (= -$5 - $2 - $3), with no
recovery from Insured under this version of the made-whole doc-
trine. Knowing this, Insurer will choose not to participate in the
suit against Tortfeasor in the first place, cutting its losses (-$5 >
-$10) and leaving Insured to his own devices. " The solution to
the game is therefore {sue for $20; don't participatel, with In-
sured reaping a recovery of $3 in excess of his uncompensated
injuries.
This version of the made-whole doctrine thus violates one of
the purposes of subrogation: preventing the insured from being
unjustly enriched.99 We must look elsewhere for a definition of
the made-whole doctrine.
In an ideal world, compensation would make an accident vic-
tim indifferent between being injured and not being injured. 00
This suggests another definition for the made-whole doctrine: an
accident victim has been made whole when compensation ren-
ders him indifferent between not having been injured on the one
hand, and having been injured and compensated on the other.
While the concept is simple to formulate, the amount that will
In the language of game theory, Insurer's strategy of not pursuing its subrogation
claim would be termed "strictly dominated." Id at 11.
" See text accompanying note 14.
"'Sullivan v Old Colony Street Railway Co, 197 Mass 512, 83 NE 1091, 1092 (1908)
("The principle on which [the rule of damages] is founded is compensation. Its object is to
afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of another."). See
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.14 at 204 (cited in note 84).
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achieve precise indifference, neither over- nor undercompen-
sating an accident victim, is likely to exist only as a point in
Euclidean space. To paraphrase one court, "No rational man
would change places with the injured man for an amount of gold
that would fill the room of the court, yet no lawyer would contend
that such is the legal measure of damages."'0 '
At least two courts have "solved" the problem by acknowl-
edging the need for a mini-trial on the issue of whether the vic-
tim has been made whole.'0 2 This solves nothing, and only adds a
layer of complexity to an already difficult problem. Without
knowing the meaning of "made whole," a factfinder cannot an-
swer the question of whether the insured has been made whole.
On this level, a mini-trial constitutes a judicial abdication, re-
quiring a finder of fact to determine whether an undefined re-
quirement has been satisfied.
But the difficulties with this mini-trial have only begun;
there are four additional problems. First, determining whether
an accident victim has been made whole frequently includes an
assessment of nonpecuniary damages such as pain and suffering,
requiring a finder of fact to put numbers on the inherently un-
quantifiable. For example, should the finder of fact measure the
victim's damages by how much he would have paid to avoid the
injury in the first place, or by how much a tortfeasor would have
to pay him to receive permission to commit the tort?0 3
Second, the costs of the mini-trial solution may well run
amok. Ignoring the costs of the litigants' time, legal fees alone
could easily devour the subrogated amount. At this stage of the
litigation, the insured typically has the money paid by the tort-
feasor. As the game in Figure 1 suggests, if an insurer finds its
expected recovery too low, it will decline to proceed with the
mini-trial, leaving the insured with a double recovery, and frus-
trating the goals of subrogation.
'
0 1Heddles v Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co, 74 Wis 239, 42 NW 237, 243 (1889).
"Rimes, 316 NW2d at 356; Ludwig, 393 NW2d at 146 n 2.
"For a discussion of the dizzying complexities of this point, see Mark Geistfeld, Plac-
ing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages
for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 Cal L Rev 773 (1995) (concluding that juries, in calculating
damages for pain and suffering injuries, should consider how much a reasonable person
would have paid ex ante to eliminate the risk of those injuries). See also Edward J.
McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va L Rev 1341 (1995). Courts find calcu-
lating damage awards difficult enough as it is. See generally Christopher P. Bowers,
Comment, Courts, Contracts, and the Appropriate Discount Rate: A Quick Fix for the Le-
gal Lottery, 63 U Chi L Rev 1099 (1996) (discussing discount rates for lost future profits
in contract damage awards).
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A third difficulty with a mini-trial is that the insurer is put
in the uncomfortable situation of taking inconsistent litigation
positions. When the insured victim sues the tortfeasor, it is fre-
quently the insurer who is actually presenting the case. At this
point, the insurer must argue that its insured's damages are
large and serious, both to obtain a favorable verdict for the in-
sured, and to protect its own subrogation rights. °'
But in a subsequent mini-trial, the insurer must undertake a
forensic reversal of positions: to receive its share of the recovery,
the insurer must now argue that the insured has in fact been
made whole. To do so, it must argue that the insured would be
adequately compensated by a small amount, that his injuries
were not so serious after all. Stripped of the legal niceties, the in-
surer is put in the position of having to say, "fooled you."
Finally, requiring another trial-mini or otherwise-con-
sumes the resources of an already overtaxed judicial system.
Courts should seek to simplify the decisionmaking process, not
complicate it. Nor is it practical to require the original factfinder
to pass on whether the insured has been made whole. First, the
determination is no easier than at the earlier stage. Further-
more, in many jurisdictions the collateral source rule hides the
insurer's involvement from the jury, giving the insurer no hope of
vindicating its rights. °5 And even without the collateral source
rule, the insurer would be placed in the untenable position of ar-
guing, at the same trial, that the damages were both serious and
minor.10 6
CONCLUSION
The made-whole doctrine rests on tenuous foundations. This
Comment has attempted to show that a strict doctrinal approach,
based on suretyship doctrine, supports the made-whole doctrine
only in two situations: when the statute of limitations has run
against the insurer but not against the insured; and when the in-
sured has taken a security interest in an insolvent tortfeasor's
property.
"If the factfinder decides that the insured's injuries are not serious, it may award
him little or nothing, and the insured will not have been made whole. Under the made-
whole doctrine, the insurer would receive nothing.
" See, for example, Mont Code Ann § 27-1-308(c)(3) (1995); Proctor v Castelletti, 112
Nev 88, 911 P2d 853, 854 (1996).
"For a discussion of the complexity and permissibility of taking inconsistent litigat-
ing positions, see generally Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Re-
thinking Erie for Judicial Estoppel, 64 U Chi L Rev 873 (1997).
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Furthermore, the risk allocations in suretyship do not neces-
sarily track those in the insurance context. There is no a priori
assumption about the parties' relative risk aversion in surety-
ship. In contrast, insurers are the quintessential risk spreaders
and are therefore entirely risk-neutral. Insureds, by definition,
are risk-averse. This difference presents the strongest economic
argument for allocating the risk of an incomplete recovery to the
insurer.
But even this argument does not stand up to close scrutiny.
A risk-averse individual could better protect himself against
large losses under a pro tanto regime, by purchasing a policy
with a larger limit, than he could under a made-whole regime in
which he pays the insurer to assume the risk of an incomplete
recovery. Finally, the difficulty of determining when the insured
has been made whole, combined with the loss of judicial economy
necessitated by a mini-trial, add to the doctrine's inefficiency.
On balance, the pro tanto regime appears to be more efficient
for three reasons. First, it better tracks the risk preferences of
the parties. Second, it places the incentive to achieve the last
dollar of recovery from a tortfeasor on the party whose efforts
matter most in achieving it: the insured. Finally, it avoids the
definitional problems of the made-whole doctrine and the time
and effort of a mini-trial.
This Comment therefore recommends that three steps be
taken. First, at a bare minimum, courts should allow subrogation
when insurance policies in question provide for it and insurers
would be able to proceed under a right of reimbursement rather
than subrogation proper. Insurers would do themselves a favor
by rewording their policies to allow them recovery under any
cause of action-reimbursement, restitution, or subrogation. Sec-
ond, and preferably, courts should enforce subrogation clauses as
they appear in insurance policies, even in situations in which an
insurer's statute of limitations has expired or the insured has
fortuitously taken a security interest in the tortfeasor's property.
This approach is justified by the complications of the made-whole
doctrine and the relative risk aversions of the parties. Finally,
because of these two factors, both courts and legislatures should
adopt pro tanto subrogation as a default rule.
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